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THE BOUNDARY PROBLEMS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.*
A major premise of this Symposium is that risks of injury associ-
ated with highly technological activities have increased rapidly in re-
cent years and will continue to increase in the future. In attempting to
control these risks, governments undoubtedly will adopt enterprise lia-
bility systems - that is, systems of strict liability imposed on commer-
cial, professional and governmental enterprises for the injuries caused
by those enterprises. Some of these liability systems may be established
judicially. A greater number will be established legislatively. Regard-
less of their source, they will share a commitment to the principle that
enterprises should compensate for the injuries they cause, including in-
juries caused by carefully and skillfully conducted activities.'
For the enterprises singled out for the imposition of enterprise lia-
bility, strict liability will replace fault-based liability; for the rest, liabil-
ity will continue to be imposed largely on the basis of fault under
traditional tort principles. Moreover, traditional negligence principles
will continue to govern the tort liabilities of what might be termed
"non-enterprises" - that is, the noncommercial, nonprofessional, non-
governmental activities of individuals and groups of individuals in our
© 1982 by James A. Henderson, Jr. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B. 1959, Princeton Univer-
sity; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard Law School.
1. Legal writers have used the phrase "enterprise liability" in a variety of contexts. I
use it here in what might be called its traditional sense. See generaly Klemme, The Enter-
prise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976). In addition to the
emphasis on compensating injured claimants on the basis of strict liability, "enterprise lia-
bility" also connotes the shifting of liability from individual actors to the larger enterprises
for which those actors engage in risk-creating conduct. Thus, commentators frequently ex-
plain the rule of respondeat superior, which holds masters vicariously (and strictly) liable for
the torts of their servants committed within the latters' scope of employment, in terms of
"enterprise liability." See, e.g., W. PROSSEM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th
ed. 1971); Note, Borrowed Servants and the Theory of Enterprise Liability, 67 YALE L.J. 807
(1976). Although I would exclude most systems of taxation from my definition of "enter-
prise liability," because typically they are not assessed against specific enterprises or do not
involve compensating the victims of accidental injuries, I do not intend to limit myself to
liability imposed in a judicially implemented action to recover tort damages. I would, for
example, include bureaucratically administered liability/compensation systems, such as
worker compensation, within my definition of "enterprise liability." I would also include
compensation systems such as the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941 (1976).
For a recent analysis urging bureaucratically managed enterprise liability as an alternative
to tort liability, see Pierce, Encouraging Safety.- The Limits of Tort Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 1281 (1980).
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society.2
In developing systems of enterprise liability, draftsmen will be re-
quired to answer many questions. Which enterprises will be subject to
this special treatment? Who will be allowed to make claims? For what
elements of injury? What will be the basis for determining benefits?
How will the systems be funded? Who will administer them? How will
disputes be resolved? Commentators and decisionmakers have ad-
dressed these questions in the past, in a variety of contexts,3 and they
will confront any future enterprise liability proposal. Important
though these questions are, however, they are not my primary concern
in this article. Instead, I wish to focus on what I shall call the "bound-
ary problems" of enterprise liability - that is, the problems associated
with the need to establish boundaries separating clusters of activities
and consequences that are included within a particular strict liability
system from those that are excluded. Commentators have discussed
these boundary problems4 but never, to my knowledge, has anyone
brought together and analyzed them systematically. I have two reasons
for believing that these problems deserve special attention: first, they
present issues that transcend the confines of enterprise liability, illumi-
nating some implications of our legal system's general reliance on rule
formality; and second, because they come close to being intractable,
they may significantly influence the development of enterprise liability.
Decisions to adopt enterprise liability are likely to be premised on
the assumption that strict liability is superior to traditional negligence
liability in at least three respects: (1) it compensates injured victims
2. It should be observed that these "nonenterprises" will continue to be subjected only
to negligence-based liability in large measure because the objectives described in the text
accompanying notes 5-7 infra cannot be achieved by imposing strict liability on their activi-
ties. See Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability. Implications of
the Theory ofthe Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1048 (1980); cf. infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIC-
TIM (1965); Henderson, Alternative Approaches to Establishing a Compensation System for
Victims of Medical Accidents, in ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY,
DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 53-79 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA FEASIBILITY STUDY]; Soble, A Proposalfor the Administrative Compensation
of Victims of Toxic Substances Pollution. A ModelAct, 14 HARV. J. LEG. 683 (1977).
4. For treatments of the "which enterprise should be liable for which injuries?" prob-
lem, see G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 133-97 (1970); J. O'CONNELL, ENDING
INSULT TO INJURY: No FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 70-80 (1975).
For an analysis of the efficiency implications of establishing specific boundaries, see Ehrlich
& Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule Making, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 260-71,
277-80 (1974). For an analysis of the implications of strategic behavior around the bounda-
ries of strict products liability, see Henderson, supra note 2, at 1059-92. For a discussion of
boundary problems in fields other than tort law, see McKie, Regulation and the Free Market.
The Problem ofBoundaries, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 6 (1970).
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more frequently;5 (2) it more effectively deters unacceptably risky con-
duct, thus reducing accident costs;6 and (3) it entails comparatively
lower administration costs.' This article will not explore the legitimacy
5. Under a negligence regime, even very dangerous enterprises need not compensate
those whom they injure as long as marginal investments in safety are adequate. Under strict
liability, enterprises "pay for what they break" regardless of the care they take to avoid
causing injuries. From a fairness perspective, commentators have justified the increased
frequency of compensation on several grounds. Professor Epstein, for example, insists that
the root of the claimant's right to compensation is the fact that the defendant enterprise
caused him to suffer harm. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
168-69 (1973). Professor Fletcher traces the source of the claimant's right to the defendant's
creation of "nonreciprocal risks," a system in which a victim has a right to recover for inju-
ries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from those the victim creates
and imposes on the defendant. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 537, 540-42 (1972). From an efficiency perspective, commentators have justified
increasing the frequency of compensation on the ground that it helps spread the primary
costs of accidents, thereby reducing the secondary or dislocation, costs of those accidents.
See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 39-67. For a recent analysis challenging the
ethical underpinnings of strict liability, see Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Eth-
ics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981).
It should be observed that although moving to strict enterprise liability increases the
frequency of compensation, successful claimants typically recover on a somewhat reduced
compensation schedule. At least with respect to legislatively created enterprise liability sys-
tems such as worker compensation, recovery is usually restricted to the more tangible ele-
ments of loss - e.g., medical expenses, lost wages, and the like. Intangible elements of
recovery, such as mental upset and pain and suffering, are typically excluded. In part, these
restrictions reflect a tradeoff made in the interest of keeping total premium costs in line: as
the number of successful claimants increases, the amount each receives, on average, de-
creases. The restrictions may also reflect a belief that intangible losses are less worthy of
redress, and generate too great transaction costs in their calculation on a case-by-case basis.
See generally O'Connell, A Proposal to .4bolish Defendants'Paymentfor Pain and Suffering in
Returnfor Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333.
6. Deterrence primarily relates to the objective of economic efficiency. In theory, mov-
ing from negligence to strict liability will not cause a rational enterprise to increase its in-
vestment in safety. See Posner, Strict Liability.- A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
As a practical matter, however, strict liability for accident costs which an enterprise controls
may help to eliminate wasteful underinvestment in safety due to slippage - a phenomenon
whereby manufacturers escape a portion of negligence liability due to plaintiffs proof
problems - inhering in the negligence liability system. See Henderson, Coping With the
Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 932-33 (1981). In addition,
strict liability for controllable costs may reduce the overconsumption of relatively risky
products and services by increasing their cost to consumers and thus placing them at a disad-
vantage in a competitive market. Writers have referred to this objective as the "general
deterrence," or "market deterrence" objective. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 27;
J. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 76-80.
7. These administration costs are of concern primarily from the perspective of trying to
increase the economic efficiency of the tort/compensation system. See G. CALABRESI, supra
note 4, at 225-26. Under traditional negligence rules, a high percentage of the liability pre-
mium dollar - by most accounts, over half - goes to pay the costs of running the liability
system. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 21; STATE OF N.Y. INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE. . . FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 34-35 (1970). The practical significance of these
costs has caused their reduction to become a dominant objective of proponents of enterprise
liability systems.
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of these objectives, but will, for purposes of analysis, assume them to be
appropriate. 8 Nor will this article question whether and to what extent
they would actually be accomplished by strict enterprise liability.9 In-
stead, attention will focus on the degree to which the boundary
problems are likely to affect an enterprise liability system's success in
accomplishing these objectives. Given that "risk control" is the pri-
mary focus of this Symposium, the effects of the boundary problems on
the deterrence objective will be emphasized in the following analysis.
There are two general categories of boundary problems: those
problems associated with establishing and maintaining enterprise lia-
bility boundaries, and those associated with manipulative behavior of
enterprises and claimants in response to the boundaries. In seeking so-
lutions to these problems, whenever possible I shall apply my analysis
to existing or proposed enterprise liability systems. In this connection I
shall especially emphasize the Designated Compensable Event (DCE)
Project of the American Bar Association, a recent study of a possible
enterprise liability system covering medical accidents.'I I served as le-
gal consultant to the DCE Project, and it was in that connection that I
first was challenged by, and became intrigued with, the boundary
problems of enterprise liability.
I. ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING THE BOUNDARIES
A. Problems in Defining the Scope of Liability
In defining the scope of liability, the enterprise liability draftsman
confronts the basic question "Which enterprises are to be responsible
for which injuries?" As between the "which enterprises?" and the
"which injuries?" questions, the latter is the more difficult to answer
because it turns on the issue of causation. Theoretically, it ought to be
possible to link enterprises with injuries in ways that promote the
8. For treatment of the objectives of enterprise liability, see generally Fleming, Drug
Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 297, 304-22 (1982); Franklin, Tort Liability
for Hepatitis.- An Analysis andA Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV. 439 (1972); Henderson, supra
note 6, at 931-39; Klemme, supra note 1, at 184-94.
9. Certainly a system could achieve the compensation objective. But whether a system
would achieve the objectives of increased deterrence and decreased administrative costs is
more problematic. For an interesting analysis casting doubt on the extent to which tort
liability can reduce wasteful accident costs through deterrence, see Englard, The System
Builders.: A Critical Appraisal ofModern Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 33-51 (1980).
Regarding the likelihood that administration costs will be reduced, experience with worker
compensation systems suggests that in the long run, at least, the reductions may not be so
significant as originally hoped. See generally Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the
Law oflIndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 81 (1967).
10. See ABA FEASIBILrrY STUDY, supra note 3.
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objectives of the strict liability system. For example, enterprise liability
will deter risky conduct only to the extent that it forces enterprises to
bear the accident costs over which they exert meaningful control. " But
it is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty which costs any
given enterprise can thus control. In part, the problems are evidentiary
- in some cases, it will not be possible to determine the relevant facts
with sufficient accuracy to describe what happened. But even when we
know what happened, we may be unable to identify which of many
contributing factors should be treated as the cause, or causes.
A concrete example will illustrate these problems. Assume that a
government has implemented a fairly large number of enterprise liabil-
ity systems that cover, in the aggregate, most goods and services com-
mercially distributed. Our claimant-to-be, C, is walking in the upstairs
hallway of his home shortly after lunch when he trips over a book on
the floor, falls down the stairs, and crashes his head through the glass
screen of a television receiver in the living room. 2 Which of the fol-
lowing commercial enterprises, if any, should be liable for C's injuries:
The book publisher? The contractor who built the house? The subcon-
tractor who built the stairs? The manufacturer of the television re-
ceiver? The brewing company that produced the beer C drank with
lunch, rendering him less attentive?
The first reaction of someone trained in traditional tort law is
likely to be: "None of them should be liable - it wasn't their fault that
C fell and injured himself." However, we have assumed an enterprise
liability regime in which commercial enterprises bear financial respon-
sibility for the injuries they cause irrespective of fault.' 3 So the ques-
tion remains: Which, if any, of the enterprises identified in our
hypothetical case "caused" C's injuries?
11. Professors Calabresi and Hirschoff refer to controllable costs as costs with respect to
which the enterprise is the "cheapest avoider" - that is, the enterprise is in the best position
to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and avoidance costs and to act on
that decision once it is made. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in
Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-61 (1972). These authors also include bribing other actors to
act more safely among their list of ways that an enterprise can effectively control accident
costs.
12. Professor O'Connell used a version of this hypothetical case to illustrate the same
point. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 71-72.
13. We will assume, for the sake of simplicity, that contributory negligence is no bar to
recovery. Enterprise liability systems such as worker compensation typically do not recog-
nize contributory fault as a defense. See generall 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION § 2.30 (1978). Efficiency theorists have argued against eliminating contributory fault as
a defense on the ground that there are insufficient incentives for claimants to invest their
own resources in cost effective safety measures. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6, at 207. For
an opposing view, see Walkowiak, Reconsidering Plainti's Fault in Product Liability Litiga-
tion: The Proposed Conscious Design Choice Exception, 33 VAND. L. REv. 651 (1980).
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In one sense, of course, all the enumerated enterprises caused C's
injuries, for all of them are linked to the accident on a but-for, cause-
in-fact basis. Indeed, that is why I included them in the list of possibili-
ties and did not include other enterprises - commercial distributors of
glider aircraft, for example. 4 But even if but-for causation is a neces-
sary condition to liability, it includes too many consequences to serve
as a meaningful guide in defining the boundaries of enterprise liability.
What are required are descriptions of the risks that are unique to each
enterprise in ways related to the objectives of enterprise liability. Thus,
so long as deterrence remains a primary objective, we need descriptions
of those risks that each enterprise can meaningfully control, so that we
can allocate accident costs to those presumably better, or best, able to
reduce them.
15
One possibility - to allocate accident costs to the enterprises that
"proximately cause" them - deserves initial consideration. Even if we
assume that the concept of proximate cause serves a worthwhile func-
tion in traditional negligence law,'6 it is inadequate to guide decisions
in a strict enterprise liability system. For one thing, it calls for costly,
fact sensitive, largely ad hoc decisions on a case-by-case basis, thereby
defeating the objective of lowering administrative costs.' 7 It also im-
plicitly invites the decisionmaker to determine whether the enterprise
was at fault, a determination inconsistent with the enterprise liability
14. The liability net cast by the but-for, cause-in-fact concept is very wide. Thus, while
glider aircraft would be excluded, commercial transporters of the television receivers could
be included on a but-for basis.
15. See supra note 11.
16. The proximate cause concept prevents defendants from incurring potentially crush-
ing liability in cases where their negligence could only be expected, viewed before the fact,
to cause slight injury. The marginal costs of adding the concept to the negligence analysis
appear manageable. In most cases parties do not even raise the issue. In the relatively rare
instances where parties do raise the issue, the additional costs of addressing it are small. The
parties usually do not need additional proof, relying instead on common sense assertions
based on the proof supporting the issues of fault and cause-in-fact. And only when the
judge decides the case for the defendant as a matter of law does the issue have any measura-
ble effect on the outcome. When the issue of proximate cause is given to the jury on vague
instructions, there is little reason to believe it affects their decision as a consideration in-
dependent of the issue of the defendant's fault.
17. In contrast to its relatively minor role in negligence law, see supra note 16, proximate
cause in a strict liability system is the controlling element in deciding whether to compen-
sate. As one court observed in a recent decision adopting the earlier advanced concept of
"the best cost avoider" for these purposes, see supra note 11 and accompanying text:
"[F]ixing the best or cheapest cost avoider is more difficult than might be imagined." Union
Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974). One commentator also suggested that
such a vague standard would interfere with the cost accounting necessary to achieve market
deterrence. See Michelman, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 656-57 (1971).
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
system's commitment to strict liability. 8 The need to describe the com-
pensable events accurately in order to reduce accident costs via deter-
rence must be balanced against the competing need to describe those
events specifically in order to reduce transaction costs.
Dean Merrill has suggested a formulation that might avoid the
overinclusiveness of but-for, cause-in-fact, and the vagueness of proxi-
mate cause.' 9 Arguing for holding prescription drug manufacturers
strictly liable for the harm their products cause, he has urged that proof
of a but-for, cause-in-fact connection between the taking of a drug and
the patient's injuries should give rise to a presumption of liability,
which the manufacturer can rebut only with proof of the patient's or
the prescribing physician's negligence.2"
There are several reasons to question the efficacy of Merrill's ap-
proach. First, although the patient's role in drug-induced injuries often
is passive, thus simplifying the causation analysis, in some cases the
patient contributes to the risks by failing to follow directions. In such
cases, the patient's contributory negligence presents difficulties. Sec-
ond, although the availability of relatively formal professional stan-
dards applicable to the prescribing physician would reduce
administrative costs compared with what they might be if such stan-
dards were unavailable, cases in which physicians contested manufac-
turers' allegations of malpractice nevertheless would be problematic.2'
Finally, although the universe of possible intervening causes does not
normally extend beyond those described by Merrill, in some cases it is
possible to identify other sources contributing significantly to the plain-
tiff's injuries.2 2 Holding prescription drug manufacturers liable in such
cases would allocate the accident costs to enterprises that do not mean-
18. In theory, of course, "proximate cause" and "the best cost avoider" are different
concepts from "a negligent actor." See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11, at 1060. As a
practical matter, however, lawyers and judges struggling with the former concepts are quite
likely to apply the sort of cost-benefit analysis traditionally associated with the negligence
concept.
19. See Merrill, Compensation for Prescrption Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1 (1973).
20. See id at 107-12.
21. The traditional rule in medical malpractice cases is that a court judges individual
physicians against the standards of their profession. See generally McCoid, The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558-60 (1959). In recent years courts
have indicated that they may independently review the adequacy of health care procedures.
See generally Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528,
528-29 (1976). Even if the traditional approach is retained, the so-called "medical malprac-
tice crisis" of the mid-to-late 1970's suggests the difficulties that can arise. See authorities
cited infra note 129.
22. Intervening actors whose negligence may contribute to the plaintiff/patient's injuries
include: a treating physician other than the prescribing physician; the drug retailer; a mem-
ber of the plaintiff/patient's family; or the plaintiff/patient's employer.
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ingfully control the relevant risks, and to that extent would defeat the
deterrence objectives of enterprise liability.23
Moreover, even if we assume that Merrill's rebuttable presumption
approach would prove workable in cases of prescription drug-related
injuries, it is doubtful that it would provide adequately clear bounda-
ries for other systems of enterprise liability. In other contexts, the uni-
verse of contributing causes is larger, and more frequently includes the
conduct of the claimant.24 And the standards for judging the negli-
gence of other possible contributors are vaguer - and more difficult
and thus more costly - to apply.25 For example, were we assigned the
task of developing a system imposing enterprise liability on building
contractors for stair-related injuries of the sort encountered in our ear-
lier hypothetical case, a rebuttable presumption approach would pres-
ent decisionmakers with issues such as: "Should the book at the top of
the stairs - or the television receiver at the bottom - constitute an
intervening cause?"
It follows that if the boundaries of enterprise liability are to ac-
complish acceptably low levels of transaction costs, the draftsman must
avoid vague, value-laden principles such as "reasonableness" and
"proximity." Instead, he must specifically describe, in essentially em-
pirical, rather than normative, language, the consequences for which
enterprises will be held strictly accountable. Thus, from a transaction
costs perspective the boundaries of enterprise liability must not be ab-
stract and conceptual; they must be concrete boundaries, drawn specifi-
cally in terms of time and space.
Practical experience with enterprise liability systems supports this
conclusion. The boundary commonly relied on to define the limits of
worker compensation - "injuries arising out of and in the course of
23. To some extent, of course, the manufacturer might be able to redesign the drug, or
market it differently, to reduce the risks to the plaintiff from these examples of intervening
conduct. But in the cases described supra note 22, the manufacturer's degree of control
would be minimal. Of course, the compensation/cost spreading objective would be served
even if the deterrence objective was not. See supra note 5.
24. Applying Merrill's approach to durable products such as automobiles demonstrates
this point. Negligence on the part of many actors other than the designer and manufacturer
of the vehicle contribute to causing accidental injuries: the operator of the vehicle; operators
of other vehicles; repairers of the vehicle; designers and maintainers of the roadways; and
regulators of vehicular traffic, to name just a few. Given this wide array of rival hypotheses,
it is difficult to see how Merrill's approach would simplify the proofs and arguments in many
cases.
25. Although courts have traditionally relied on professional custom in judging the neg-
ligence of doctors, see supra note 21, they have refused to give controlling weight to industry
custom in nonmedical contexts. See, e.g., The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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employment" - is a good example.26 In the early days of worker com-
pensation, such statutory language was given a fairly literal meaning in
the "time and space" sense described above, and administrative costs
were held in check.27 Over time, however, under pressure to make
worker compensation systems more responsive to injured workers'
needs for compensation, courts gradually expanded earlier interpreta-
tions, extending coverage to include a variety of injuries occurring off
the employment premises.28 Today, the boundaries of worker compen-
sation in some jurisdictions have become so vague, and their applica-
tions in many cases so problematic and costly, that some commentators
want to eliminate the work connection requirement in favor of around-
the-clock social insurance systems.29 Implementing these proposals
might solve the problem of high administrative costs, but only at the
expense of all but abandoning the objective of deterring risky, socially
wasteful activities by means of a civil liability system.30
Products liability law also illustrates the unworkability of vague
enterprise liability boundaries. As every student of American tort law
is aware, in the 1960's courts began imposing privity-free, strict tort
liability on product sellers for injuries caused by manufacturing de-
fects.3 1 This judicially established enterprise liability system covering
manufacturing defects has worked satisfactorily over the last several
decades because the boundaries of liability are drawn specifically in
terms that avoid value-laden concepts such as "reasonableness under
the circumstances. ' 32 Thus, the presence of a manufacturing defect
and its causal connection with the plaintiff's injuries can be determined
relatively mechanically;33 and the categories of enterprises held strictly
26. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 13, § 6, at 3-1.
27. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 9, at 71-72; R. Henderson, Should Workmen's
Compensation Be Extended to Nonoccupational Injuries?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 117, 122-23
(1969).
28. See generally R. Henderson, supra note 27, at 126-27.
29. See, e.g., Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance.: A
Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 56; R. Henderson, supra note 27.
30. Again, deterrence is achieved by imposing liability on enterprises that are able to
control the relevant accident costs. See supra notes 6 and 12. Extending worker compensa-
tion to around-the-clock social insurance would impose liability for costs that the relevant
enterprises do not control.
31. The classic treatments of this movement to strict liability are Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
32. The standards against which a court determines the presence of a manufacturing
defect are the intended design and the intended function; such a defect causes the product to
be self-defeating, and no external reasonableness standard is necessary. See generally Hen-
derson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices.- The Limits ofAdjudica-
tion, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 1531, 1542-50 (1973).
33. When a relatively new product dangerously fails to perform its intended function, a
1982l
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liable - product sellers, lessors, and the like - are defined specifically,
as a matter of law, so as to avoid costly case-by-case inquiries into
whether the strict enterprise liability system does or does not obtain.34
In contrast, it has proven impossible to fashion adequate bounda-
ries for a system of strict enterprise liability covering injuries caused by
the design and marketing of products. Negligence traditionally has
supported liability for unreasonably risky product design and market-
ing.35 However, in spite of increased pressure to move beyond negli-
gence to strict liability36 - indeed, in spite of one influential court's
attempt to impose a products liability version of Dean Merrill's bur-
den-shifting approach a3 - strict enterprise liability for product design
and marketing has yet to be implemented.3" Strict enterprise liability
would require a test for liability that did not rely on case-by-case deter-
minations of reasonableness. However, perhaps because any test
couched in more specific terms appears to exclude too many worthy
claims and to include too many unworthy, none has been adopted.39
These experiences with worker compensation and strict products
liability reveal the inherent antagonism between the objectives of acci-
dent cost reduction via deterrence and administrative cost reduction via
strong inference of manufacturing defect is available to the injured plaintiff. The most diffi-
cult cases are those involving product failures that product age or misuse arguably caused.
34. See generaly Henderson, supra note 2, at 142-47 (discussing enterprises generally
conceded to be within strict liability boundaries).
35. See, e.g., Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1955); Brady v.
Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. App. 253, 589 P.2d 896 (1978); Woodill v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 79 IUI. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980). See generallfy Birnbaum, Unmasking the Testfor
Design Defect.- From Negligence [to Warranty/ to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 593 (1980) (arguing that negligence standard must still be used in design defect cases).
36. See, e.g., Adler, Strict Products Liability. The Implied Warranty of Safety, and Negli-
gence andHindsight, As Tests of Defect, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 581, 603-04 (1974); Polelle, The
Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability." The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 101, 134-35 (1976).
37. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
38. Some courts and commentators have insisted that strict liability is being applied.
See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 443, 442 (1972); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825 (1973). But the basic standard in most product design cases is the cost-benefit analysis
from the traditional negligence cases. See generaly Birnbaum, supra note 35; Henderson,
Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design. Toward the Preservation of an
Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1979).
39. Limiting liability to those cases in which the designs are self-defeating - that is, in
which the designs fail to perform their intended functions - strikes most courts as too exclu-
sive an approach. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
On the other hand, expanding liability to include all cases in which the product design is the
cause-in-fact of injury strikes most courts as too inclusive. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note
32, at 1554. From the present perspective, what is needed is a set of formal boundaries that
would allow strict enterprise liability to occupy the middle ground between these two
extremes.
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specification. If a draftsman specifically defines the injuries for which
an enterprise is to be strictly liable in formal, "no nonsense" terms, he
will avoid disputes regarding application and will minimize transaction
costs. At the same time, his system inevitably will include some inju-
ries that the enterprise cannot control, and exclude some injuries that
the enterprise controls. As a result, the actual deterrence effects will not
be congruent with the deterrence effects that ideally should occur, and
thus not all the substantive objectives of the liability system will be
achieved. But if the draftsman attempts to reduce this incongruence
between the actual and the ideal by relying on vague concepts such as
"reasonableness," "controllability" and "causal nexus," disputes re-
garding applicability will arise more frequently and the hoped-for re-
ductions in transaction costs will not materialize. Proponents of strict
enterprise liability argue that negligence law errs by relying too heavily
on vague standards of decision;4' but the draftsman of an enterprise
liability system must understand that rule specificity generates its own
social costs in the form of incongruence between the results reached
and the deterrence goal of the liability system. From the standpoint of
efficient resource allocation, the draftsman should aim for the optimum
level of rule specificity at which the sum of incongruence costs and
transaction costs is minimized.41
The conceptual problems associated with the causation issue are
reflected in the Designated Compensable Event (DCE) Project of the
American Bar Association.42 Building on the earlier work of Professor
Ehrenzweig4 and, more recently, the work of Professors Havighurst
and Tancredi," the A.B.A. Commission on Medical Professional Re-
sponsibility recommended in 1977 that its Innovative Alternative Sub-
committee explore the possibility of implementing an enterprise
liability system based on a pre-defined list of adverse outcomes arising
from medical treatment.45 Such a system rests on the assumption that
for most medical treatments and procedures it is possible to identify
those adverse outcomes over which medical professionals exert signifi-
cant control - that is, adverse outcomes that are usually, though not
40. See general
, 
J. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 56-67.
41. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 4.
42. See supra note 10.
43. Ehrenzweig, Compulsory '1ospital-Accident" Insurance.- A Needed First Step To-
ward the Displacement of Liabilityfor "AedicalMalpractice, " 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1964).
44. Havighurst, "MedicalAdversity Insurance"-- Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J.
1233; Havighurst & Tancredi, "'Medical Adversity Insurance" - A No-Fault Approach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 INs. L.J. 69 (1974).
45. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY (1977).
1982] 669
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
invariably, avoidable under good quality medical care.46  Prepared
ahead of time by medical researchers and reviewed by teams of clini-
cians, these lists of adverse outcomes, or "designated compensable
events," would form the basis of an enterprise liability system in which
patients suffering listed outcomes would be paid out of the proceeds of
insurance, obtained ahead of time by the relevant providers, without
having to show that the providers were at fault. For outcomes on the
DCE lists, the enterprise liability remedy would be exclusive; for out-
comes not listed, patients would have access to the traditional tort
system.47
The theoretical attractiveness of such a proposal is apparent.
More injured patients would receive compensation, albeit, in all likeli-
hood, on a lower per-claim benefits schedule. 4  By focusing on the
quality of outcomes and tying the provider's insurance premium to his
claim rate,49 the DCE system would create incentives for improving the
quality of health care.5" Moreover, by defining the compensable events
46. This concept of general avoidability is closely akin to the premise underlying the
common law tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which permits an inference of negligence
based upon the fact of the injury itself. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 227-28;
Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979). As used
in the enterprise liability context, the avoidability concept would be broadened somewhat to
include all instances in which the rate of adverse outcomes differs significantly between good
and bad medical care, regardless of whether bad care was responsible for a large majority of
adverse outcomes. The basis for this more liberal approach to the controllability concept is
the DCE system's formal abandonment of the fault principle - all that really matters is that
strict liability imposes significantly different liability costs on good and bad medical care
providers on a long run basis, regardless of the absolute likelihood in specific cases that
either class of providers was negligent.
47. Barring plaintiffs' access to the traditional tort system for unlisted outcomes was felt
to be unjustifiably harsh and thus politically unacceptable. Given the overlap between the
DCE lists and the sorts of injuries for which recovery could be had under traditional negli-
gence principles, see supra note 46, the DCE system would presumably eliminate a substan-
tial proportion of the existing medical malpractice caseload; if the transaction costs
associated with the cases based on unlisted outcomes were deemed unacceptable, the DCE
statute might increase plaintiffs burden of proof to, e.g., clear and convincing evidence.
48. See supra note 5.
49. "Experience rating" means that each insured's premiums reflects the insured's claims
experience; the more claims an insured has experienced in the past, and thus the more claims
he is likely to experience during the period covered by the insurance, the higher will be his
liability insurance premiums.
50. In theory, the negligence system should succeed in pressuring health care providers
to invest optimally in safety. See supra note 6. For the argument that it also succeeds in
practice, see Schwartz & Komisar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 130 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1282 (1978). In practice, however, given the slippage that occurs in retroactively ap-
plying vague standards on a case-by-case basis, negligence law may create inadequate safety
incentives. To that extent, moving to strict liability should produce a marginal gain in risk
control. The resulting differentials in premium costs should cause some sloppy providers to
"shape up," and should cause some incurably sloppy providers to "ship out" - that is, to
leave the relevant health care speciality. This second possible deterrence effect rests on
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specifically and making compensation fairly automatic, the system pre-
sumably would reduce transaction costs.5 And by eliminating findings
of fault on the part of individual health care providers, it might remove
much of the "sting," and the accompanying strain on provider-patient
relationships, from decisions to compensate the victims of medical
accidents.
52
Obviously, no list of compensable events can eliminate coverage
disputes completely - realistically, the goal would be to reduce sub-
stantially, not to eliminate, the incidence of such disputes.53 To achieve
this goal, the draftsman would have to link medical treatment to com-
pensable adverse outcomes by specific temporal and spatial boundaries
that would all but eliminate inquiries into whether the health care pro-
vider actually had control over the relevant risk of injury in a particular
case. An example of an adverse outcome linked temporally to treat-
ment would be "death occurring during, or within a specified period of
time following, certain types of surgery." Thus, if a patient (perhaps
premises that I should make explicit: namely, that the market for health care services is
competitive and that consumers of medical services are price sensitive. Given existing barri-
ers to entry into the medical profession, together with present patterns of third party pay-
ments for much of the health care services consumed in this country, these premises may be
false. If they are - if health care providers enjoy monopoly profits that more than make up
for differentials in liability costs, and are able to pass on liability costs to patients and their
insurers without significant penalty - then the "ship out" (market deterrence) potential of
the DCE system will be much diminished. It should be observed that the "shape up" effects
would persist even in the face of monopoly profits and consumer price insensitivity, since the
sloppy provider could increase his monopoly profits by investing in increased safety. For an
argument to this effect in an analogous context, see Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regu-
lation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 577-84 (1969).
In any event, if the underlying assumption of market competition and price sensitiv-
ity is at least partially valid, the worthwhile deterrence effects just described should be real-
ized. On the same assumptions, adopting a DCE system might reduce the overall
consumption of health care services, depending on the effects of such adoption on overall
liability premium costs. If moving to a DCE system caused the overall costs of premiums to
rise significantly it can be assumed that fewer units of health care services, relative to the
potential patient population, would be consumed. This effect would persist even after the
"shape up/ship out" effects on sloppy providers took hold, as long as the liability premium
costs to the remaining "reasonably careful" providers remained relatively higher than under
traditional negligence law. As a practical matter sponsors of enterprise liability systems try
to avoid dramatic increases in aggregate insurance costs. See supra note 5. Theoretically,
however, adoption of a DCE system might generally reduce consumption of medical
services.
51. Again, the goal here is to incur optimal transaction costs. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
52. To the extent the "sting" accompanying a negligence judgment imposes a real acci-
dent cost on the provider, it helps to accomplish the "shape up" objective of negligence law.
The assumption here is that the award of money damages accomplishes all the deterrence
necessary, and that the "sting" constitutes a wasteful transaction cost that the negligence
system generates.
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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between prescribed ages and otherwise in normal health)54 died during
a routine appendectomy, liability would be imposed regardless of
whether the surgeon in the individual case could have prevented the
outcome. Often, some error on the part of the surgeon or the anesthesi-
ologist would have been significant in causing death. Indeed, the
probability of such a casual connection is essential if the liability sys-
tem is to succeed in reducing the accident costs of poor quality treat-
ment. But the DCE system would have to embrace the occasional
aberration in order to avoid significant administrative problems."
Not only would the list of compensable events have to include
some adverse outcomes that were beyond the control of the health care
provider, but in the interests of lowering administrative costs it would
also have to exclude some outcomes that were within the provider's
control. In the main, these would be adverse consequences that are not
discoverable until after a relatively long period following treatment.
Simply abandoning a temporal cut-off would not accomodate these
cases. "Death following surgery," without any time limit, would in-
clude too much. Equally clearly, "death following, and proximately
caused by surgery" would entail the administrative difficulties de-
scribed earlier.
One technique to avoid the extremes of overinclusion and under-
inclusion would be to link the injuries to the treatment in space, rather
than time - that is, to describe specifically those misadventures-dur-
ing-treatment that could be expected to result eventually in injury or
death and that are by their nature traceable to the treatment. Thus, the
draftsman might describe the event causing a given patient's death as
"damage to the ureter during gall bladder surgery. ' 56 Even if the first
symptoms of such a misadventure manifested themselves days or weeks
later, while the patient was convalescing at home, it would be relatively
easy to trace the patient's injuries to the earlier surgery. Admittedly,
54. The assumption here is that for patients in these general categories, the presenting
condition is likely to cause adverse results that are beyond the control of competent provid-
ers. Some high risk patients would present conditions the risks of which are controllable, of
course, and presumably they should be included in the DCE lists regardless of their high
risk character. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
55. Suppose, for example, that the roof of the operating room fell on the patient during
surgery, killing him. Including such a result on a DCE list via a "death during surgery"
description would not only avoid wasteful bickering that could be expected in other cases if
exceptions were made for "mechanical failures" and the like, but also would help make
clear the "no-fault" character of the liability being imposed and thus help to eliminate the
"sting" to which I referred earlier. Of course, if an enterprise liability system covered the
hospital and/or the building contractor, that system could be made primarily liable.
56. This was, in fact, an adverse outcome suggested by Professors Havighurst and Tan-
credi. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 44, at 75-76.
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the greater the reliance on spatial, as opposed to temporal, linkages, the
greater the costs of determining causation are likely to be. But some
adverse outcomes could be linked to medical treatment in this manner
without generating unacceptable increases in administrative costs.
These techniques for avoiding errors of inclusion and exclusion
have obvious limits. Adverse consequences that occur beyond the spec-
ified period of time and that cannot be traced unambiguously to a mis-
adventure during treatment would have to be excluded from coverage.
The draftsman might attempt to "fine tune" the boundaries of the DCE
system by using variations of Dean Merrill's rebuttable presumption
approach.57 But to invite inquiry into proximate causation on a case-
by-case basis, even if the draftsman armed decisionmakers with pre-
sumptions of causation, would threaten the efficacy of most enterprise
liability systems.5
Determining the sources of claimants' injuries is most difficult in
situations where exposure to toxic substances years earlier allegedly
caused the claimants' injuries. The problems are not so much concep-
tual as evidentiary. Frequently, experts can conclude only that the
chemical substances manufactured and distributed by a particular com-
mercial enterprise contributed to the risk of injury; they cannot readily
determine whether the individual claimant would have suffered the
same injury had he never been exposed to those substances. 59 If every
claimant recovered fully in such cases, claimants as a class would be
overcompensated; if every claimant were denied recovery, claimants as
a class would be undercompensated. To avoid either result, and at the
same time eliminate the high costs of case-by-case determinations of
causation, the draftsman of an enterprise liability system covering such
injuries might allow each claimant to recover a portion of his losses
corresponding to the percentage by which the enterprise's activities in-
creased his risks of injury. Admittedly, such an approach would not
eliminate evidentiary difficulties; in many cases it would be difficult to
determine the contribution of the relevant enterprise to the risk of in-
jury. But that determination should be easier than determining the ac-
57. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 107-12. For an example of a proposed enterprise
liability system that relies heavily on a rebuttable presumption approach, see Soble, supra
note 3, at 796-800.
58. One commentator hopes that the enterprises will thereby be forced to divulge infor-
mation otherwise unavailable to claimants. See Soble, supra note 3, at 744-47. But I believe
the greatest part of the problem stems from the conceptual interdependency of the various
contributing causes, not from any conspiracy to hide information.
59. See generally Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Needfor a New Approach
to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 279 (1960).
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tual causes of a particular injury in a given case.60
One might object that this approach, even if feasible, would not
provide complete justice in any case. Although it might properly treat
victims as a class, on an individual basis it would undercompensate
those victims who were actually injured by the enterprise in question,
and would overcompensate those who were not.61 In assessing such an
objection, we again must ask the ultimate question - whether these
incongruence costs outweigh the transaction cost savings that the sys-
tem realizes by not considering the causation issue on a case-by-case
basis. In any event, if we assume that the contribution of the relevant
enterprise to the risks in question is more than trivial but less than
overwhelming, this "partial justice" approach seems preferable to
either denying recovery altogether or allowing every claimant to re-
cover in full. 62
In cases where a number of commercial enterprises are known to
have contributed to the risks of injury from dangerous toxic substances,
the draftsman might define the relevent "enterprise" to include all the
commercial firms contributing to the relevant risks, and then allocate
the burden of compensating victims among those firms in proportion to
their contributions to the combined risks. If the toxic substances are
commercially distributed products, the burdens could be allocated on
the basis of various firms' market shares over the relevent time period.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of California approving such a
market share approach in a class action brought against manufacturers
of a generic prescription drug63 has generated considerable contro-
versy.64 Although the California high court's handling of the boundary
60. Id. at 296-98.
61. See Note, Market Share Liability and DES - Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories:
Square Pegs in Round Holes, 13 CONN. L. REV. 777, 806-11 (1981)..
62. If an enterprise's percentage contribution to the relevant risks were quite high,
though less than 100% - if it were 85% for example - one might consider going ahead and
awarding full recovery on the assumption that the 15% that in theory represents too severe a
monetary sanction might well be offset as a practical matter by the failure of some victims to
make claims. The Atomic Bomb Fallout Compensation Act of 1982, S. 1483, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982), approved April 20, 1982 by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Commit-
tee, adopts an approach quite similar to the one described here. A claimant who establishes
a "probability of causation" in excess of 50% between his cancer and the 1951-1962 Nevada
atmospheric nuclear tests would receive compensation for 100% of his cancer-related inju-
ries. Claimants who establish probabilities between 10% and 50% would receive a corre-
sponding percentage of compensable damages and claimants who establish a probability of
less than 10% would receive nothing.
63. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
64. For commentary approving the Sindell approach, see, e.g., Note, DES and a Pro-
posed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 1000-08 (1978); Note, Indus-
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problems in that case leaves much to be desired,65 the underlying con-
cept of market share cost allocation appears sound and could very well
serve as the basis for a statutory enterprise liability system covering
instances where the source of the unacceptably dangerous product that
harmed a particular claimant cannot be traced.66
But even if an enterprise liability system could be successfully im-
plemented covering the products liability situations just described, it is
doubtful that such a system would succeed in the critical cases involv-
ing injuries caused by discharging harmful commercial by-products
into the environment. For one thing, it would be more difficult to mon-
itor the harmful outputs of various enterprises than it would be to de-
termine the market shares of those enterprises' products. 67  For
another, given the likelihood of synergistic effects in contexts such as
air pollution, it would be more difficult to determine the extent to
which any given output contributed to the risks that materialized in the
claimant's injury.68
These difficulties are reflected in the limited reach of the so-called
Superfund legislation69 enacted by Congress in 1980 in response to the
risks associated with hazardous substances released into the environ-
try- Wide Liability and Market Share Allocations of Damages, 15 GA. L. REV. 423, 443-50
(1981). For commentary criticizing the Sindell approach, see, e.g., Fischer, Products Liability
- An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1658-62 (1981); Kroll,
Intra Industry Joint Liability: The Era of Absolute Products Liability, 687 INS. L.J. 185
(1980).
65. See generally Fischer, supra note 64, at 1658-59. Among the problems identified by
Professor Fischer are the possibility that manufacturers who represent less than 100% of the
market may be forced to pay 100% of the plaintiffs' damages, id. at 1645-46, and the likeli-
hood that proof regarding the relevant shares of the market may be inadequate, id. at
1648-50.
66. A statutory scheme could presumably address the "nonjoined defendant" problem
by requiring all manufacturers to contribute to the compensation fund, and could require
prospective record keeping to help alleviate problems of proof. For a recent article approv-
ing of the market share principle on the assumption that each tortfeasor will be liable only
for its individual contribution to the risk, see Robertson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:
Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982).
67. For a description of the difficulties encountered in trying to monitor outputs in the
air pollution context, see generally Vickrey, Theoretical and Practical Possibilities and Limi-
tations of a Market Mechanism Approach in Air Pollution Control (June 11, 1967) (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association, Cleveland, Ohio),
quoted in Wolozin, The Economics ofAir Pollution.- Central Problems, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 227, 236 (1968).
68. See generally Roberts & Stewart, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1644, 1650-52
(1975).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981). The formal title of the act is the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. See generally
Development, Super/und- Conscripting Industry Supportfor Environmental Cleanup, 9 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 524 (1981) (examining the problems addressed by the Act).
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ment. The statute calls for a $1.6 billion Hazardous Substance Re-
sponse Trust Fund, designed primarily to underwrite the cleanup of
hazardous substances releases and the restoration of damaged natural
resources. 70 Taxes on petroleum products7' and certain basic com-
pounds used in the manufacture of chemical products 72 will raise most
of the $1.6 billion. General federal revenues will fund the balance.73
Persons found responsible for releasing hazardous substances into the
environment will be held strictly liable to finance cleanup efforts and to
reimburse the fund for monies already expended for that purpose.74
But such recoveries are not the primary source of funding.
It follows that the drafters of the Superfund legislation have
avoided the boundary problems of concern in this article largely by
abandoning tI~e basic enterprise liability concept that gives rise to those
problems. The main thrust of the statutory scheme is to make available
immediately the funds necessary to clean up releases of hazardous sub-
stances and to effect repairs of significant harms to the natural environ-
ment. Assessing the responsible enterprises for costs of cleanup and
repair is of secondary importance, and the statute does not attempt to
compensate victims. I do not intend necessarily to criticize the
Superfund legislation in this regard. Indeed, it may well have ad-
dressed a major social problem in workable fashion. In any event, in
drafting the Superfund legislation Congress avoided the potentially in-
tractable boundary problem described in this article by making little or
no commitment to the principle of enterprise liability.
B. Problems of Updating the Boundaries
The time dimensions of enterprise liability raise issues that tran-
scend the boundary problems I am considering.75 Changes in circum-
stances will require many aspects of an enterprise liability system to be
re-examined periodically. Benefit schedules that were reasonable when
first implemented, for example, through time may become inade-
quate.76 But the passage of time is especially likely to affect the bound-
aries that define the injuries for which the enterprise is liable. This
70. The fund is referred to as the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9631 (Supp. V 1981).
71. Id. § 9631(b)(1)(A).
72. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4661-4662 (Supp. V 1981).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (Supp. V. 1981).
74. Id. § 9607.
75. See generally Henderson, supra note 2.
76. Some states have turned to more flexible limits on worker compensation benefits
based on the employee's actual weekly average wage. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
152, § 26 (West 1981).
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stems from the need to define those boundaries formally and specifi-
cally. Vague language such as "harms proximately caused by the en-
terprise" would not require periodic revision because it would invite
the decisionmaker in any given case to consider a broad range of con-
temporaneous attitudes and circumstances surrounding the relevant
events in deciding the causation issue. However, the draftsman of an
enterprise liability system must avoid vague concepts such as proximate
cause because they generate unacceptably high application costs. In-
stead, he must decide ahead of time, with relative specificity, which
outcomes to include in, and which to exclude from, the system. Be-
cause such decisions leave less room for adjustment at the rule applica-
tion stage, they will need to be reviewed periodically and revised to
account for changes in knowledge regarding both the sources and the
avoidabilty of the relevant risks. Without needed revision, errors of
inclusion and exclusion will occur more frequently and the attendant
incongruence costs will mount. In deciding how frequently to revise
the boundaries, the costs of revising the boundaries must be weighed
against the savings in incongruence costs.77
The necessity for periodic review and revision of the boundaries is
clearly evident in the proposed DCE system covering medical acci-
dents. At the outset, a panel of medical experts would list as designated
compensable events those adverse outcomes which are generally avoid-
able in the course of providing competent medical treatment. As new
medical technology develops, some adverse outcomes that were una-
voidable at the outset will become avoidable, necessitating revision of
the DCE lists.
C. The Problem of Interest Group Manoulation of the Boundaries
This section considers another unavoidable consequence of relying
on formal enterprise liability boundaries: the necessity of protecting
them from excessive interest group manipulation. When a system re-
lies on vague concepts such as "proximate causation," it usually re-
solves policy issues at the rule application stage. Given the relatively
low profile of such a policymaking process and the limited access of
nonparties to that process, it is unlikely to become highly politicized.78
77. And the optimal mix of revision costs and "incongruence-due-to-obsolescence" costs
must in turn, be weighed against the marginal costs of case-by-case administration to deter-
mine how specifically the boundaries should be drawn. See supra note 41 and accompany-
ing text.
78. The statements in the text are limited to what may be referred to as "private law tort
actions" brought by individual plaintiffs. So-called "public law" lawsuits, in which large
classes of plaintiffs join to alter the structure of public institutions, typically are highly
politicized. See generally D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Diver,
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In contrast, especially with regard to the majority of enterprise liability
systems that are established legislatively, the policymaking inherent in
establishing and periodically revising the boundaries has a much
higher profile. Indeed, the question is not whether the process of
boundary establishment will become politicized - it will - but how
the politics can be managed so as to maintain an appropriate balance of
relevant interests.
If all the persons and groups of persons interested in the question
of where the boundaries will be located were more or less equally in-
formed and in positions to act effectively on the information, then cus-
tomary parliamentary and administrative procedures presumably
would achieve an acceptable balance.7 9 But such equality is rare. The
majority of these liability systems will represent legislative responses to
the risks generated by complex technology, and the regulated enter-
prises typically will possess a significant informational and strategic ad-
vantage over those whom the technology adversely affects. Either the
regulatees will be allowed to establish the boundaries in the first in-
stance, or they will be called upon to supply their expertise to the
boundary draftsman. Thus, the political processes of defining and
maintaining the boundaries of enterprise liability systems will be sus-
ceptible to interest group manipulation.8 ° I am not suggesting that
these problems are unique to the establishment of enterprise liability.
Administrative law scholars have been examining for many years the
phenomena to which I refer.8' I merely want to emphasize the poten-
tial for abuse that inheres in drawing formal enterprise liability
boundaries.
The proposed DCE system for medical accidents illustrates the po-
tential for boundary manipulation. Presumably, the DCE lists would
be drafted by medical experts who best can determine which adverse
outcomes providers can generally avoid through competent medical
treatment. These same experts, of course, would be affected directly by
their own decisions, because those decisions would determine the pat-
The Judge as Political Powerbroker Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions,
65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Insti-
tutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
79. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Stew-
art, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1760-76
(1975).
80. See generally Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies.-
The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429, 1438-39 (1978).
81. The phenomenon of "capture" of administrative agencies by the industries they aim
at regulating has been much mooted in the law journals. See, e.g.. Cutler & Johnson, Regu-
lation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1404 (1975); Noll, The Economics and
Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016, 1027 (1971).
[VOL. 41
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
terns of liability for their medical specialties. If self-interest dictated
where the experts drew the boundaries, only those outcomes for which
providers already were exposed to substantial liabilities under tort law
would appear in the DCE lists. Providers would benefit from including
those outcomes in the system because the schedules of recovery for suc-
cessful claimants would, in most instances, be lower than under tradi-
tional tort law. 2 On the other hand, providers would benefit from
keeping off the lists outcomes for which they are not generally liable in
tort.
83
How might the draftsman prevent these manipulations of the
boundaries? I am not certain that he could. One's first reaction may
be to suggest consumer input into the boundary establishment process;
that certainly would be consistent with the recent trend in administra-
tive law.84 Whether consumer input in the DCE system is feasible is
open to serious doubt. Laymen almost certainly cannot undertake in-
dependent review. Medical malpractice attorneys probably could de-
tect extremes of overreaching. They would notice, for instance, if the
only outcomes included on the DCE lists were those that exposed pro-
viders to substantial liability under traditional negligence law. In addi-
tion to using this admittedly limited input from nonmedical personnel,
administrators might be able to rely on "disinterested medical experts."
I suspect, however, that such experts, like unicorns, are more easily de-
scribed than discovered. 5 The only way someone can gain the exper-
tise necessary to prepare and update the DCE lists is to practice
regularly in the relevant medical specialty; and anyone who practices
regularly in the specialty to which the DCE system applies is hardly
"disinterested. 8 6
82. See supra note 5.
83. Outcomes included on the DCE lists expose providers to strict liability. If the pro-
vider's exposure under negligence law for a particular outcome is relatively small, he will
benefit by keeping it off the lists.
84. See authorities cited supra note 81.
85. Some writers have argued in favor of using impartial medical witnesses to assist
judges and juries in tort actions under traditional negligence principles. See, e.g., Peck,
Impartial Medical Testimony - A Way to Better and Quicker Justice, 22 F.R.D. 21 (1959);
Zeisel, The New York Expert Testimony Project. Some Relections on Legal Experiments, 8
STAN. L. REv. 730 (1956); Note, The Doctor in Court- Impartial Medical Testimony, 40 S.
CAL. L. REV. 728 (1967). It should be observed that the experts in those contexts are not
called upon to reach decisions that directly affect their own welfare, as they would be in the
DCE context.
86. Despite these problems, it may be possible to develop procedural safeguards to in-
sure that the lists are as reliable as possible. For example, the legislative choice of experts
should involve input from responsible medical groups such as the American Medical Associ-
ation that includes a statement of the individual's reliability and professional standing. An-
other way to remove bias at the state level is to use out-of-state experts who the state
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Beyond trying to provide a proper balance of inputs in the admin-
istrative boundary establishment process, the draftsman could rely on
judicial review to assure that the DCE lists conformed to the underly-
ing objectives of the liability system. Whether and to what extent such
reliance is justified are questions that are outside the scope of this arti-
cle. Given the extremely technical nature of the judgments reflected in
the DCE lists, I would be very surprised if courts could perform any-
thing but a superficial review.87
II. COPING WITH POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE STRATEGIC
RESPONSES TO THE BOUNDARIES
The interest group activities described in the preceding section are
aimed at influencing where and how the boundaries are drawn. In the
situations examined in this section, claimants and enterprises accept the
boundaries as given, but try to avoid their intended effects. Hopefully,
many of the behavioral changes induced by the enterprise liability
boundaries would be the sorts of socially beneficial changes intended
by the draftsman. As the following subsections explain, however, some
behavioral effects of boundary establishment would represent distor-
tions that would tend to thwart, rather than promote, the intended
objectives of enterprise liability.
A. Ex Ante Behavior by Enterprises and Their Clientele
The strategic behavior of concern in this subsection occurs before
the fact of accidental injury, as both the enterprises and their clientele
try to minimize the financial burdens that the liability system seeks to
impose on them. These behavior patterns derive from the different
financial consequences of a given accidental injury, depending on
whether the injury is included in, or excluded from, the enterprise lia-
bility system." As long as the injuries associated with closely substitut-
able activities result in the same liability, the decision to include or
exclude them will not influence choices among or between those activi-
ties. But if the injuries associated with closely substitutable activities
are treated differently - if some are included within and some ex-
cluded from the enterprise liability system - the boundaries of enter-
legislation will not bind. Administrative review of insurance company records would iden-
tify significant variations in compensation and thus faulty draftsmanship. As an additional
check, draft legislation could be circulated among health care professionals for suggestions.
87. See generally Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 817, 822 (1977).
88. I should make clear that this general point applies equally well in the context of the
ex post behavior of claimants described in the next section.
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prise liability will influence enterprises to choose activities associated
with excluded injuries over activities associated with included inju-
ries.89 To the extent that the liability system thereby induces enter-
prises to engage in less risky activities, it will enhance the deterrence
objectives of enterprise liability. However, if the favored activities to
which enterprises turn in response to the boundaries are just as risky as
the activities disfavored by the enterprise liability system, the deter-
rence objectives of enterprise liability will be undermined.90 Indeed, to
the extent that the enterprise liability system induces enterprises to turn
to substantially riskier behavior, it actually may be counter-
productive.9'
A concrete example will clarify this problem. Let us return to our
earlier "fall down the stairs" hypothetical. Assume that we have imple-
mented an enterprise liability system that includes injuries caused by
television receivers92 and that we have prepared a list of accidental in-
juries for which television receiver manufacturers are strictly liable. In-
cluded in the list of compensable events are glass breakage-related
injuries of the sort our claimant, C, has suffered. Excluded from the
list, due to the difficulties of establishing causation, are visual impair-
ments associated with long-term television viewing. We previously
have recognized the sorts of "incongruence costs" that would be gener-
ated by excluding television-related visual impairments, and will as-
sume that normally it would make sense to incur those costs in order to
avoid the even greater incongruence costs of including all visual im-
pairments or the transaction costs of determining causation on a case-
by-case basis.
Now let us assume, however, that the same technology that
reduces the risks of glass breakage-related injuries also increases the
risks of visual impairment - that is, let us assume television receiver
manufacturers can guard against glass breakage-related injuries, for
which the manufacturers are strictly liable, by adopting designs that
cause a higher incidence of visual impairments for which the manufac-
89. At least if one assumes that the enterprises' exposures to liability are greater for
included activities.
90. The injuries associated with activities favored in this manner may have been ex-
cluded from the enterprise liability system because the relevant enterprises cannot control
them, or because their inclusion would generate unacceptably high transaction costs.
91. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 1063.
92. In actuality, an enterprise liability system covering such injuries would not be lim-
ited to television receivers, but would include a broad range of commercially distributed
products.
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turers are not legally responsible. 93 On this assumption, including glass
breakage-related injuries in such an enterprise liability system actually
would be counterproductive if the social costs of the increased visual
impairments outweighed the savings in glass breakage-related injuries.
What can the draftsman do to avoid these sorts of counterproduc-
tive substitutions? The most obvious solution would be to anticipate
such responses and to treat similarly injuries caused by closely substi-
tutable, equally risky activities. In our hypothetical liability system
covering television receiver manufacturers, for example, the draftsman
probably should include some of the more serious types of visual im-
pairments even if their inclusion generates incongruence or transaction
costs significant enough to justify excluding them but for the substitu-
tion effects. In the alternative, the draftsman could exclude glass
breakage-related injuries from the enterprise liability boundaries -
manipulations are prevented by treating substitutable modes of behav-
ior similarly, not necessarily by including them within the enterprise
liability boundaries. But given the underlying objective of requiring
enterprises to pay for the harm they cause, the first-mentioned solution
- including some elements of visual impairment - is probably prefer-
able. If the costs of including visual impairment cases are simply too
great, the draftsman might consider leaving glass breakage-related in-
juries within the system and proscribing specifically, by regulation,
those alternative modes of design shown statistically to expose televi-
sion viewers to unacceptably high risks of visual impairment.
The proposed DCE system covering medical injuries might cause
counterproductive substitution effects whenever a health care provider
is in a position to substitute for a treatment likely to cause a listed ad-
verse outcome a treatment equally (or more) likely to cause an unlisted
(and equally adverse) outcome. We could expect health care providers
acting in their own interests to make such substitutions even when they
increase the overall costs of treatment, so long as someone else bears
those costs without objection. 94 To prevent these sorts of substitution
93. I have no reason to believe that the factual premise of this hypothetical is true - it is
used here merely as an example for the sake of discussion.
94. See Abraham, Medical Ma/practice Reform: 4 Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REV.
489, 524 (1977); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts. An Essayfor Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CH. L. REV. 69, 89 (1975); Calabresi, The Problem ofMalpractice: Trying
to Round Out the Circle, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 131, 136 (1977).
There are several reasons for believing that health care providers would, to some
extent at least, be able to pass costs on in this fashion. For one thing, patients are not expert
enough to second-guess the decisions of the providers, especially where the costs of alterna-
tive, unlisted treatments are nonmonetary costs. For another, third-party insurance fre-
quently picks up the monetary costs, diffusing the negative financial effects on the individual
patient. The situation may be somewhat different in the context of consumer products,
[VOL. 41
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
effects, the DCE draftsman would have to include within the list of
compensable events some adverse outcomes that are not generally
avoidable in the course of good medical care, but that are associated
with modes of treatment that are closely substitutable for modes that
produce controllable (and hence includable) adverse outcomes.95 The
draftsman would have to draw the DCE lists so that they treat equally
costly alternative procedures roughly the same with respect to the in-
clusion and exclusion of their likely outcomes. To some extent, this
would cut against the general objective of including avoidable, and
only avoidable, outcomes. But if the draftsman is to avoid potentially
self-defeating substitution effects, he would have to reach an acceptable
compromise.
The most difficult problem of this sort would arise when the health
care provider decided not to treat at all because the only available
treatment involved substantial risks of listed adverse outcomes. The
difficulties of attempting to include the results of nontreatment on the
DCE lists96 would force the DCE system to rely on a combination of
traditional negligence liability for egregious refusals to render care,
97
and the opportunity for the provider to charge concommitantly more
for high-risk treatments. At least if one assumes that consumers of
medical services are able to appreciate the implications of receiving
treatment for high-risk ailments, providers specializing in high-risk
cases should be able, appropriately enough, to pass on the extra costs
and thus avoid being unfairly penalized.9 8
where price differentials based on relative risks may have a more telling impact on demand
for particular products. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
95. For example, a physician may confront a choice between surgery and drug therapy.
If some of the major adverse effects of surgery are included on the DCE lists, and the ad-
verse effects of drug therapy are excluded, the DCE system will create incentives for the
physician to choose the latter form of treatment over the former, or at least to advise the
patient to make that choice.
96. Including the results of failures to treat would be difficult for the same reasons that
tracing the consequences of failures to act is generally difficult in our tort system. Every case
presents hypothetical, "what would have happend if... ?" questions that compound the
already problematic task of deciding whether the provider breached his duty to act.
97. See, e.g., Wilmington Gen'l Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
98. A basic assumption underlying the DCE proposal is that consumers of health care
services are to some extent price sensitive. See supra note 50. Thus, it is assumed that when
providers charge significantly different fees for the same services, consumers will tend to be
influenced in favor of the one who charges less. (This assumption would be bolstered if
providers were required to disclose their liability premiums). This is not inconsistent with
the earlier assumption in note 94 supra, that consumers are not able to make "apples and
oranges" comparisons among and between various modes of treating the same ailment, nor
is that earlier assumption inconsistent with the present assumption that consumers usually
can appreciate the fact that they present a high-risk condition that calls for a high-cost
specialist.
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To this point, I have focused on enterprises' attempts to avoid their
"fair share" of financial responsibility for the injuries they cause. An-
other potential source of distortion is the clientele's behavior in choos-
ing enterprises from which to purchase goods and services. Even if the
draftsman succeeds in blunting the efforts of regulated enterprises to
avoid responsibility, the clientele of those regulated enterprises will un-
dermine the objective of controlling the social costs of accidents if they
can substitute different, unregulated enterprises as sources of relatively
less expensive - but just as risky - goods and services. If the imposi-
tion of enterprise liability increases the liability costs of relatively risky
enterprises, 99 the prices to consumers of the goods and services those
enterprises supply presumably will reflect the increased costs. lOO If con-
sumers have access to goods and services that are substitutable for the
regulated goods and services, but that are supplied by enterprises not
subject to strict enterprise liability, the unregulated goods and services
will enjoy a price advantage in the market. To the extent that consum-
ers tend to undervalue the insurance components of regulated goods
and services,10' they will underconsume those goods and services rela-
tive to the unregulated substitutes; and to the extent that the unregu-
lated substitutes are just as risky as their regulated counterparts, the
accident cost reduction objectives of the enterprise liability system will
be frustrated. Indeed, if the unregulated, and therefore overconsumed,
goods and services are substantially riskier than those produced by the
enterprises subject to strict enterprise liability, the imposition of enter-
prise liability actually may be counterproductive.10 2
The solution to this problem of market distortions is to subject en-
terprises producing equally risky goods and services that are close sub-
stitutes for one another to the same liability rules. But there are
important sources of substitute goods and services that, for some rea-
son, strict enterprise liability cannot cover. In the main, these are non-
commercial, nonprofessional, "do-it-yourself' activities that a
draftsman cannot, as a practical matter, subject to formal regulation. 10 3
99. This assumption may not obtain, to the extent that the schedules of benefits are
adjusted to keep total costs in line. See supra note 5.
100. See generally Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - The Insignf-
cance ofForesight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 584-88 (1961) (discussing risk spreading and the allo-
cation of losses among various enterprises).
101. This tendency may be produced by two characteristics of consumers: inability to
assess the risks associated with commercially distributed goods and services, and an unwill-
ingness to invest in adequate insurance to cover risks that they perceive. Regarding the
former characteristic, see generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL RE-
PORT 63 (1970). Regarding the latter, see generally J. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 73-76.
102. Cf. supra note 91 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Whenever such unregulable activities can provide substitutes for a
regulable enterprise's goods and services, the draftsman should con-
sider whether to withhold strict liability from the latter enterprises so as
to avoid potentially counterproductive market distortions. °4
B. Ex Post Strategic Behavior by Claimants
This section examines behavior patterns that occur after an acci-
dental injury, as claimants try to maximize the benefits available to
them from the various liability systems that arguably apply to their sit-
uations.10 5 Just as inclusion of an injury within the enterprise liability
system impacts financially on the enterprise and its clientele in ways
that may induce ex ante distortions in their behavior, so inclusion of
the injury may induce ex post distortions in the injured claimant's be-
havior. The claimant may manipulate the relevant facts, attempting to
characterize his claim in a way that brings greater benefits under either
the traditional fault or the enterprise liability system; or he may com-
bine claims under both liability systems in ways that tend to thwart the
underlying objectives of enterprise liability. To some extent, of course,
these problems derive from failure to define the relevant enterprise lia-
bility boundaries with sufficient specificity. But the problems transcend
vagueness in the boundary definitions.
The concept of a boundary implies drawing formal distinctions be-
tween factually similar cases. When these distinctions lead to substan-
tially different legal consequences, both claimants and enterprises have
incentives to strain the labelling mechanism to achieve more favorable
results. When the pressures are directed at the boundaries themselves,
we may regard them as part of the "politicization" problem discussed
above. When they are directed at the facts of a particular case, how-
ever, they are less political than mechanical. The enterprise liability
draftsman's task is to design boundaries that discourage, or at least do
not encourage, manipulations of evidence in individual cases.
The key to success in this endeavor is to draw specific boundaries
in terms of objectively verifiable referents that the claimant cannot con-
trol."° Coverage should not depend on the claimant's subjective state
104. Perhaps the clearest example in the product liability area concerns the question
whether strict liability should be imposed on commercial sellers of used products, such as
used automobiles. Given the existence of an active noncommercial market in such products,
imposing strict liability on commercial sellers may drive purchasers into the unregulable
(and possibly riskier) private market. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 1081-85.
105. Enterprises also engage in ex post strategic behavior. The emphasis here is on claim-
ants because typically they take the initiative in this regard.
106. Specificity and verifiability are separate but related concepts. States of mind, for
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of mind. Consider, for example, our earlier fall-down-the-stairs hypo-
thetical. Inclusion of the case within the enterprise liability system
should not depend on whether the claimant suffered mental upset."°7
Moreover, inclusion should not depend on factors that are substantially
within the claimant's control, such as whether the claimant has missed
a certain number of workdays, or has incurred a certain minimum total
in medical expenses.'08
The enterprise liability draftsman also should anticipate and try to
prevent claimants bringing separate claims under the enterprise liabil-
ity and the traditional negligence systems. One assumption underlying
enterprise liability is that a system should provide exclusive remedies
for injuries included within it. To allow several claims would under-
mine the objective of reducing transaction costs and would, to the ex-
tent that duplicative recovery resulted, unjustly enrich claimants and
their attomeys.' 9
Enterprise liability legislation can deal with the problem of an in-
jured claimant initiating both a traditional tort action and an enterprise
liability claim against the same enterprise in the same jurisdiction. For
example, the enterprise liability statute might require claimants suffer-
ing injuries arguably covered by the enterprise liability system to initi-
ate a claim under that system before commencing a tort action."10 The
statute could provide further that a finding of coverage under the enter-
prise liability system would preclude a subsequent action in tort, leav-
ing the enterprise liability claim as the exclusive remedy. A finding of
noncoverage similarly should bind the claimant, the enterprise, and the
latter's liability insurer."I In this connection, it might be advisable to
allow the tort liability insurer, if a separate entity from the enterprise
liability insurer, to participate in the preliminary determination regard-
example, can be described quite specifically and yet are frequently difficult to verify by
objective proof.
107. The common law limitations on recovery for so-called "fright without impact" re-
flect this view. See generally Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 761 (1933); Miller, The
Scope of Liabilityfor Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit
the Crime," 1 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1(1979).
108. One technique to reduce incentives for claimants to generate false "losses" in this
way is to pay only a reduced percentage of a claimant's losses. See R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 281-83.
109. The collateral source rule in traditional tort law condones double recovery in some
circumstances. See, e.g., Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H. 227, 183 A.2d 729 (1962). But commen-
tators have widely criticized the rule. See generally Fleming, he Collateral Source Rule and
Loss 41location in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966); Note, Unreason in the Law of
Damages.- The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1964).
110. Mechanically, the tort plaintiffcould be required to include in his complaint an alle-
gation that an enterprise liability claim had been made and denied.
111. Bind them to the finding, not to liability.
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ing coverage.'1 2 When more than one enterprise liability system ap-
plies to a given injury, the draftsman should provide a mechanism to
determine which of the systems should contribute to the claimant's
compensation. Although the enterprise liability and traditional tort
systems probably should be segregated fully, several enterprise liability
systems might be interfaced so that each would contribute to the claim-
ant's recovery in instances of dual, or multiple, coverage.
Another problem that an enterprise liability draftsman should an-
ticipate relates to the possibility that claimants will bring both enter-
prise liability claims against covered enterprises and collateral tort
actions against defendants who are not covered by enterprise liability.
A draftsman could prevent double recovery by requiring a claimant to
offset recovery from one source against recovery from the other. Con-
ceivably, either recovery could offset the other, but allowing the enter-
prise liability recovery as an offset against tort recovery would be more
consistent with the objectives of enterprise liability."l 3 Even though
such an offset would preclude the claimant's double recovery, however,
it would not adequately allocate responsibilities among the relevant en-
terprises. For example, the enterprise held liable in tort might have a
right of indemnity against the enterprise covered by the enterprise lia-
bility system. If the injured claimant succeeded in his collateral tort
action, and if the tort defendant succeeded in his action for indemnity
against the enterprise covered by the enterprise liability system, the
covered enterprise would have lost the benefit of an enterprise liability
system designed to provide an exclusive remedy." 14
Several approaches to this problem are available. Denying the in-
demnity rights of those held collaterally liable in tort might not suffice
to alleviate the problem because those held liable in tort frequently
may be in a position to pass to the covered enterprises by contract a
112. A "vouching in" provision similar to that relied on in article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code could be provided. See U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a) (1976).
113. Given the commitment of the enterprise liability system to the principle that covered
enterprises should pay for all of the harm they cause, see supra note 1 and accompanying
text, arguably that system's coverage should be primary.
114. This is a very serious problem currently in connection with the interface between
strict products liability and worker compensation. When an employee is injured while
working with machinery in the workplace, and recovers from the manufacturer of the
machine, may the manufacturer recover from the negligent employer who is otherwise im-
mune from tort liability to the injured employee? For a good discussion of the problems
overlapping workers' compensation and product liability, see Lambertson v. Cincinnatti
Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977); Weisgall, Product Liability in the Work Place:
The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis.
L. REV. 1035.
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major portion of the relevant liability costs." 5 One approach to this
problem would be to deny rights in tort against all tortfeasors with re-
spect to injuries covered by at least one enterprise liability system." 6
Perhaps the ideal solution would be for the legislature to implement
separate liability systems covering the enterprises against whom a
claimant is likely to bring a collateral tort action and to provide some
statutory mechanism for allocating the enterprise systems' contribu-
tions to claimants' recoveries."'
More difficult problems would arise when claimants initiate sepa-
rate claims proceedings against the same or different enterprises in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Even if the enterprise liability legislation prevents
a claimant from filing separate claims within its own jurisdiction, the
legislation cannot assure that its provisions will be given extraterritorial
effect. "I Thus, a claimant might initiate an enterprise liability claim in
a state recognizing such rights of recovery, and commence a tort action
in another state in which traditional tort law remains the only basis of
liability. Because many of the commercial enterprises likely to be sub-
ject to enterprise liability coverage conduct business in every state, the
claimant could serve the defendant with process in the common law
tort jurisdiction."I9 If the tort jurisdiction applied its own law and al-
lowed full tort recovery, the claimant could end up being overcompen-
sated. Moreover, the tort liability costs might, in part at least, be
passed on to the covered enterprise via contract.
What, if anything, can the draftsman do to deal with these difficul-
ties? The claimant might be required to reimburse the enterprise liabil-
115. In the example discussed in the preceding footnote, the machinery manufacturers
will be able to pass on a portion of their liability costs, at least, to the employer-purchasers of
new machinery.
116. In the DCE context, for example, nurses could be immune from liability in all cases
where at least one physician was strictly liable. The legitimacy in principle of this approach
depends on the extent to which the covered enterprises meaningfully control the risk-creat-
ing activities of the actors immunized from tort liability. See supra notes 6 and 11 and
accompanying text.
117. This would be a way of coping with situations in which the relevant enterprises did
not exert meaningful control over one another's risk-creating activities.
118. Under the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, a state has little
power to bind another state, see H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 204, at 389 (E. Scoles 4th ed. 1964). If enterprise liability rules are merely procedural, then
they will have no extraterritorial effect. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF
LAWS § 122 (1971). If viewed as substantive law, then the extraterritorial effect of the legis-
lation will depend on which choice of law the states involved use. See H. GOODRICH, supra,
§ 6, at 6-7.
119. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (a forum has in
personam jurisdiction if the defendant has "minimum contacts" with it). See generaly Kur-
land, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958) (tracing the history of the "minimum contact" rule).
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ity insurer from any out of state tort recovery.' 20  Beyond this
admittedly imperfect solution,12m there is little that the draftsman of an
enterprise liability statute designed for enactment at the state level can
do in our federal system to assure that foreign courts will recognize the
exclusivity of the enterprise liability remedy. 122 In the end, reliance
must be placed on the sense of comity that may exist, or that can be
fostered, in the courts and legislatures of other jurisdictions. If the leg-
islature in the "home" state limits the application of its enterprise lia-
bility system to accidental injuries occurring within its borders, and
stands ready to give comity to reasonable efforts of other states to cre-
ate similar enterprise liability systems whose remedies purport to be
exclusive, one ought to expect a fairly encouraging level of interstate
cooperation. Indeed, a uniform state law approach to the problem
might be feasible. 23 To the extent that such comity is not forthcoming,
and to the extent that the resulting duplication of claims proceedings
and recoveries constitutes a serious problem, it may be necessary for
the federal government to implement nationwide enterprise liability
systems. ' 2
4
III. How THE BOUNDARY PROBLEMS WILL AFFECT THE FUTURE
OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
This section will assess the likely effects of the boundary problems
on the question whether, rather than how, enterprise liability will be
implemented in the future. One should begin such an assessment with
the general observation that, in most instances, problems associated
with an endeavor reduce the probability that anyone will undertake the
endeavor. On this view, the boundary problems of enterprise liability,
in and of themselves, could only tend to reduce the likelihood that
courts and legislatures will turn to such liability systems as methods of
controlling technological risks. And yet some of the boundary
problems examined in this article call for solutions involving expan-
120. For discussions of subrogation by medical insurers against the proceeds of tort re-
coveries, see generally Capwell & Greenwald, Legal and Practical Problems Arising from
Subrogation Clauses in Health and/Accident Policies, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 255 (1971); Note,
Insurance Subrogation in Personal lnjury Torts, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 621 (1978).
121. It is imperfect to the extent that it defects the objective of making the enterprise
liability coverage primary. See supra note 113.
122. See authorities cited supra note 118.
123. Given the recent experience with uniform laws approaches in the torts area - for
example, the failure of passage of the Uniform Product Liability Act in a single state - I am
very doubtful that a uniform state law approach would succeed here.
124. Clearly there are no constitutional barriers to federal incursions into the
tort/compensation area. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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sions, rather than contractions, of enterprise liability. For example, the
ex ante substitution effects on enterprises and their clientele might be
minimized by including greater numbers of injuries within the reach of
enterprise liability.'25 And one solution to the problem of ex post ma-
nipulations by claimants involves extending enterprise liability to all of
the actors and activities against whom the claimants might bring ancil-
lary tort actions. 126
It follows that the boundary problems addressed in this article im-
part something of an "all or nothing" quality to the question whether
and to what extent enterprise liability will be implemented in the fu-
ture. At the beginning, the boundary problems will weigh against such
implementation. But once enterprise liability systems are adopted, the
mood and momentum generated by boundary problems could be ex-
pected to shift to one of "since we've come this far, we should go fur-
ther." On this view, boundary problems would be greatest early in the
transition period between the traditional negligence system and broad
implementation of enterprise liability.
Notwithstanding the tendency for boundary problems to exert
pressures toward expansions of enterprise liability, sweeping imple-
mentation of such liability systems is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
An important reason for my pessimism is my assumption that the
American public is, and probably will remain for the indefinite future,
unwilling to accept the increases in liability insurance premiums that
large-scale implementation would generate. 127 Whether this assump-
tion is correct is beyond the scope of this article. If it is, the major effect
of the boundary problems described in this article will be in helping to
determine which enterprises, from among the many presenting difficul-
ties under traditional negligence liability rules, are likely to be selected
for strict enterprise liability treatment.
It is fairly easy to identify the areas in which negligence law is
currently encountering substantial difficulties: commercial sellers' and
suppliers' liability for defectively designed and marketed products; 128
liability of commercial and professional providers of services, including
liability of health care providers for medical malpractice; 129 and liabil-
125. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
127. I do not have hard data to support my conclusion in this regard. Professor
O'Connell shares my view. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 73-76.
128. See general, Henderson, supra note 32.
129. See, e.g., Berkman, Alternatives to Medical Malpractice Litigation, 12 FORUM 479
(1977); Schrero, Patient Compensation Funds. Legislative Responses to the Medical /alprac-
(ice Crisis, 5 NEW ENG. J.L. & MED. 175 (1979); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative
Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
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ity of commercial and governmental enterprises for environmentally
harmful activities, including the improper disposal of hazardous
wastes.' 30 Many of these areas require solutions to the problems aris-
ing from the adverse impacts of sophisticated technology on social wel-
fare; in all of them, the courts are floundering in attempting to apply
traditional tort law principles.' 3 '
Consistent with the analysis in this article, enterprise liability is
more likely to be implemented in those areas where the boundary
problems are relatively less difficult, and vice versa. Thus, in the areas
of products liability concerned with the design and marketing of prod-
ucts, new systems of enterprise liability are more likely to be imple-
mented in connection with prescription drugs, where the causal
connection between the product and the claimant's injuries can be de-
termined without questioning whether the manufacturer was at fault.132
They are less likely to be implemented in connection with products
such as durable goods, motor vehicles and household appliances, where
resolutions of the causation issue would be more difficult. 3 3 Given the
significance of the boundary problems of enterprise liability in these
product categories, legislatures concerned with the rising costs of acci-
dents and accident reparation systems are more likely to rely on combi-
nations of administrative regulation134  and reform of the rules
governing negligence-based liability. 135
The implementation of enterprise liability systems covering com-
mercial and professional providers of services will depend on the feasi-
bility of compiling lists of specifically described adverse outcomes for
which such providers could be strictly liable. The DCE Project con-
ducted by the A.B.A. Innovative Alternatives Subcommittee suggests
that in the field of medical services, at least, such lists are feasible. 36
130. See generally Soble, supra note 3, at 703-14 (recommending a new model of admin-
istrative compensation).
131. See generally Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat From the Rule
of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976).
132. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. For a description and critique of
drug injury compensation systems in West Germany, Sweden, and Japan, see Fleming,
supra note 8.
133. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
134. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976); Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
135. The Uniform Product Liability Act, promulgated by the Department of Commerce
in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979), is an example of the sort of reform that might be contem-
plated. See generally Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act - A Brief O'erview, 33
VAD. L. Rav. 579 (1980); Twerski, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law- A
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 221 (1978).
136. See ABA FEASIBILrrY STUDY, supra note 3, at 5, 11-45.
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Whether medical services are unique in this regard is not clear,'37 nor is
the answer to the question whether, even in connection with medical
services, other boundary problems would prove insurmountable. At
the time of this writing, the so-called "medical malpractice crisis" of
the mid to late 1970's appears to have subsided.' 38 Should that un-
happy circumstance return to haunt the negligence liability system, and
should the need arise to replace the negligence system with a more
workable and less wasteful alternative, I strongly urge that the DCE
Project be carried to the next step of pilot implementation. 13 9
As for the prospects of relying on enterprise liability as a regula-
tory tool for controlling environmentally harmful conduct, the analysis
in this article counsels against optimism. The problems associated with
trying to measure various enterprises' contributions to claimants' inju-
res - indeed, the problems associated with measuring the injuries -
are probably insurmountable. Statutory schemes calling for cleanup
efforts funded by taxes levied on industrial enterprises, such as the re-
cently enacted Superfund legislation, are to be expected. But for such
schemes to be workable, they must depart significantly from the princi-
ple of enterprise liability.
CONCLUSION
On the premise that the next several decades will bring increased
reliance on strict enterprise liability as a regulatory tool for controlling
the risks of injury associated with highly technological activities, I have
identified a set of problems - to which I have applied the term
"boundary problems" - that will confront future draftsmen of enter-
prise liability systems. I have divided these boundary problems into
two categories: first, the problems associated with establishing and
maintaining enterprise liability boundaries; and second, the problems
associated with strategic behavior by enterprises and claimants in re-
sponse to the boundaries after they have been established. The most
significant problem in the first category derives from the necessity of
describing the adverse consequences of technology for which enter-
137. Medical procedures are relatively standardized, and the numbers of outside factors
are limited. Consensus regarding the controllability of events may be attainable to an extent
not attainable in connection with other less standardized activities.
138. See FINAL REPORT, ABA COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY (1977).
139. Pilot programs could be established in connection with an organized patients' group,
such as an employees' organization, or a prepaid medical services plan, such as a Health
Maintenance Organization. In those contexts, a DCE system could be worked out via con-
tract, without the necessity of enabling legislation. See ABA FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note
3, at 58-59.
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prises will be strictly liable. A significant force behind the anticipated
increase in reliance on enterprise liability will be the desire to reduce
the transaction costs generated by the traditional negligence system.
To reduce transaction costs, enterprise liability systems must describe
specifically the injuries for which various enterprises are responsible.
At the same time, in order to deter socially undesirable activities, enter-
prise liability systems generally must limit liability to those adverse
outcomes over which the relevant enterprises exercise meaningful con-
trol. The inherent tension between the need to be specific and the need
to avoid arbitrariness will, in some contexts, confront draftsmen with
problems that defy solution.
Viewed philosophically, the boundary problems examined in this
article present an intriguing question: Are we ready to cut back on our
commitment under traditional negligence law to the principle of "tai-
lor-made justice in every case" by adopting alternative liability systems
with formal boundaries that explicitly require different cases to be
treated similarly and similar cases to be treated differently? Whatever
the underlying reality, the negligence system maintains the facade, at
least, of adjusting its outcomes precisely to fit the facts of individual
cases.14  In contrast, enterprise liability maintains no such facade; it
rubs our noses, so to speak, in the necessity of drawing lines and stick-
ing to them. Viewed in this manner, the question whether enterprise
liability will be implemented in the future involves, in part at least, the
question whether we are now, or will ever be, willing to grapple face to
face with the implications of drawing formal boundaries. Recent ex-
periments with no-fault automobile accident compensation systems
provide little, if any, evidence that we are ready to face the hard choices
involved in implementing enterprise liability,' 4 1 the dominant move-
ment in liability law over the last several decades has been, if anything,
away from, rather than toward, rule formality.' 42 These philosophical
140. Whether the underlying reality conforms to the appearances in this regard is some-
what questionable. For criticisms of recent trends in negligence law, see generally Hender-
son, supra note 131; STATE OF N.Y. INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WHOSE
BENEFIT? (1970).
141. Many of these systems were so compromised in the legislative process as to be
scarcely recognizable as "no-fault" systems. The Massachusetts system is a good example.
Originally enacted primarily to hold down insurance rates, the statute contains a number of
provisions that run counter to the principles of enterprise liability - e.g., the exemption
from tort liability does not apply if the accident victim incurs more than $500 in medical
expenses, a condition that is easily satisfied in almost every case involving nontrivial inju-
ries. For a criticism of the auto no-fault systems, see Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: .A
Second Look at First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 769 (1980).
142. See generally Henderson, supra note 131, at 524-26 (advocating the necessity of re-
taining sufficient measure of formality in rules governing liability).
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considerations, together with the more practical boundary problems
discussed in this article, raise doubts concerning the extent to which
enterprise liability will play a dominant or even a significant role in
managing technological risks in the future.
